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Q

uestions about how aggressively
lifesaving measures should be
implemented often rest on the
future quality of life of the patient. A key
component of quality of life evaluations is
the ability of the individual at some point
in the future to have “meaningful
interactions” with others. Minimum
ingredients of being able to socially
interact include possessing awareness of
oneself and others, some working
memory, and the ability to communicate,
all qualities of consciousness. For many
people, decisions about withholding or
withdrawing life-sustaining treatments for
a loved one who has suffered significant
brain injury hinge on the likelihood that
the person will regain consciousness.
What’s often not understood is that
consciousness is a continuum, with whole
brain death on one end, normal levels of
arousal and awareness on the other, and
various other states in between. The
concept of consciousness was at the core
of debates over whether Theresa
Schiavo’s feeding tube should have been
discontinued—was she really in an
irreversible vegetative state, or could she
have been in a “minimally conscious
state” in which patients are severely
cognitively impaired but have some
awareness? To make matters worse, the
press has routinely interchanged terms
like “persistent vegetative state,”
“minimally conscious state,” coma, and
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Editor
“brain dead,” contributing to the overall
confusion.
Consensus among experts on
definitions of these states, along with
new research in brain physiology, has
brought some clarity and raised new
questions (see Definitions). For example,
a diagnosis of vegetative state is made
when a person loses certain bodily
functions (like control over bowel and
bladder), retains other bodily functions
(like breathing and sleep-wake cycles),
and shows no purposeful behavior that
would indicate awareness of himself or
his environment. A vegetative state is
Cont. on page 3
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MARYLAND HEALTH
CARE ETHICS
COMMITTEE
NETWORK (MHECN)

THE METROPOLITAN
WASHINGTON
BIOETHICS NETWORK
(MWBN)

O

WBN continues its relationship
with the Probate Division of the
D.C. Superior Court.
For more information about MWBN,
contact Joan Lewis, Executive Director,
202-895-9408, jlewis@iona.org.

n June 28th, MHECN sponsored a
one-day basic ethics course
(Healthcare Ethics in Action) at
Franklin Square Hospital Center. The
course/conference, aimed at providing
ethics committee members with an
overview of basic concepts in bioethics,
was co-sponsored by Franklin Square
Hospital Center and the Health Facilities
Association of Maryland. MHECN will
host a similar basic ethics conference
every other year for new ethics committee
members as well as those interested in a
refresher course on basic bioethics
concepts and skills. This Fall, MHECN is
planning a conference that will focus on
Maryland's new Patient’s Plan of Care
Form, which goes into effect in October,
2005. Look for upcoming announcements
about the date, time, and details of that
conference.
For more information about MHECN,
contact MHECN Program Coordinator:
Anita J. Tarzian, PhD, RN at (410) 706-4457,
or e-mail: MHECN@law.umaryland.edu.

M

RICHMOND BIOETHICS
CONSORTIUM (RBC)

O

n August 1st, RBC held a panel
discussion about the Theresa
Schiavo case. The Consortium is
also sponsoring an educational course
this fall for its members. RBC continues
implementing its high school science
teacher grant program, which involves
helping local high school science
teachers to produce and implement a
science unit that involves bioethics.
For more information about RBC,
contact Gloria Taylor, RN, MA, CPTC,
RBC President, taylorgj@unos.org.

SAVE THE DATES
The University of Maryland School of Law's
Center for Dispute Resolution (CDRUM)
and
Law & Health Care Program
invite you to attend a two part
Medical Malpractice Conference
September 23, 2005
The New Medical Malpractice Legislation:
Issues, Implementation & Impact
October 28, 2005
Beyond the New Medical Malpractice Legislation:
New Opportunities, Creative Solutions, and Best Practices for
Patient Safety, Tort Reform and Patient Compensation
For registration information, visit www.law.umaryland.edu/conferences.asp,
or call Toby Treem at 410-706-6228
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The Continuum of Consciousness
Cont. from page 1

referred to as “persistent” or “permanent”
based on the prognosis of irreversibility.
Like other medical prognoses, it is based
on medical probabilities of recovery. With
traumatic brain injury, vegetative state is
considered irreversible after 12 months,
and with non-traumatic brain injury, after 3
months. Some people emerge out of a
vegetative state into a minimally conscious
state (MCS), in which they still have very
limited ability to think and communicate,
but they demonstrate some evidence of
self-awareness and purposeful movements
(Giacino & Whyte, 2005).
Use of more sophisticated brain scans
and tests like functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI), positron
emission tomography (PET), and
somatosensory evoked potentials (SSEPs)
hold out hope for more accurately
diagnosing absence of consciousness
and predicting its irreversibility. For
example, in one case, a 26 year old woman
in a vegetative state for four months after
developing acute disseminated
encephalomyelitis showed spontaneous
eye opening and tracking, but no reliable
demonstrations of purposeful limb or eye
movements, which could have indicated
that she was in a MCS. Menon and
colleagues (1998) obtained PET images
both while the woman was shown digital
photographs of familiar faces and while
she was shown scrambled images of the
same photographs that no longer
resembled faces. PET images showed
certain areas of the woman’s brain
associated with visual perception and
cognition were activated while she was
being shown the familiar faces. This
woman eventually emerged from the
vegetative state and was able to verbalize
and clearly recognize faces.
A contrary finding was revealed in the
case of a woman who was in a vegetative
state for 20 years. She lacked evidence of
purposeful movements or the ability to
follow commands, but would intelligibly
verbalize single words every 24 to 72
hours. Intelligible speech is one criterion
for the diagnosis of MCS. Based on
interpretation of PET scans, Schiff and
colleagues (2002) concluded that these
verbalizations were remnants of the
formerly integrated speech circuitry in her
brain that were randomly, rather than

intentionally, firing to produce the spoken
words. Other studies revealed similar
findings, that the part of the brain
responsible for perceiving and
responding to a given stimulus is
disconnected and nonfunctioning in
patients in PVS. Such a patient might
reflexively respond to a pin prick by
flinching, but would not have awareness
of the sensation or a conscious response
to it—he or she would not be
experiencing pain (Laureys, et al., 2002).
However, brain testing cannot yet
accurately measure volitional response,
which is necessary to distinguish
between PVS, MCS, and locked-in
syndrome. The current gold standard for
diagnosis remains repeated and thorough
behavioral assessments. Andrews, et al.
(1996) estimated that up to 40% of
patients diagnosed as being in a
vegetative state in referring institutions
were found to be in a MCS when
examined at specialized referral centers.
There are several reasons for this
disturbingly high estimate, including that
volitional responses may be infrequent
and thus require a large set of
observations, and there may be
confounding impairments that interfere
with the patient’s ability to demonstrate
volitional response (e.g., paralysis,
speech dysfunction, hearing or visual
loss) (Giacino & White, 2005). Steps to
minimize errors in assessing disorders of
consciousness include using
multisensory stimuli to prompt behavioral
responses, giving commands within the
patient’s physical capability, eliciting
observations of family members or staff
participating in the patient’s daily care,
and using systematic observation
procedures and standardized rating tools
when possible. Particular care must be
taken when assessing a child to use
assessment procedures that are
appropriate to the child’s age and
developmental level (Giacino, et al., 2002).
These developments raise interesting
questions. For one, if persons in PVS
don’t experience pain and suffering
because they lack conscious awareness
of painful stimuli, does the same apply to
infants? Not long ago, infants were not
medicated for potentially painful
procedures because they were not
thought to experience pain. Is the infant’s
developing consciousness different from
the irreversible unconsciousness of the

patient in PVS who cannot experience
pain? And what about the patient in MCS
who is unlikely to progress beyond the
most rudimentary levels of conscious
awareness—if this person formerly
documented that (s)he would not want to
be kept alive if in PVS, would this also
apply to MCS? Again, distinctions
between a patient’s current level of
functioning and potential future
functioning seem important to those
making such decisions (for themselves in
the future or for a loved one). Emerging
potential treatments for disorders of
consciousness (e.g., pharmacologic
interventions, sensory stimulation,
hyperbaric oxygen therapy, and deepbrain stimulation) lack research evidence
showing their efficacy in facilitating
recovery of consciousness in patients in a
coma or vegetative state. As a result, we
must struggle with the existing
ambiguities. Joseph Fins, who has
conducted research on MCS, aptly
summed up the challenge:
If we hope to help patients and
families make the tough choices
following brain injury, we will need
to embrace the ambiguity that goes
along with long courses of recovery
and questions about altered selves.
These decisions will be more
challenging than decisions to
remove life support in the face of
overwhelming sepsis or pursue
treatment in the face of widely
metastatic cancer. We will also need
to demand diagnostic honesty and
precision. In discussing diagnoses
with families we will need to strike
a balance between realism and
hope. The objective must be to bring
greater attention to the minimally
conscious patient without
engendering expectations for the
permanently unconscious (Fins,
2005, p. 24).
Anita J. Tarzian, PhD, RN
Ethics & Research Consultant
Baltimore, MD
REFERENCES
Andrews, K., Murphy, L., Munday, R. &
Littlewood, C. (1996). Misdiagnosis of the
vegetative state: retrospective study in a
rehabilitation unit. BMJ, 313(7048):13-6.
Cont. on page 4
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DEFINITIONS
Brain dead: Irreversible cessation of all function of the brain—both the higher cognitive centers (responsible for thinking and
perceiving) and the brain stem (responsible for regulating body functions). Confirmed by tests showing no brain activity (e.g.,
EEG, brain scan, angiography). In the U.S., a person who is brain dead is considered legally dead.
Coma: Loss of function of both the cortex and the reticular system in the brain. There is no evidence of sleep-wake cycles on
EEG, the patient has no spontaneous or stimulus-induced eye-opening, and cannot follow commands, make purposeful
movements, or speak intelligibly. Coma rarely lasts longer than 2-4 weeks and is followed either by vegetative state (VS) or
recovery of consciousness.
Locked-in syndrome: A condition in which corticospinal injury has produced quadriplegia in which a patient has no ability to
make any purposeful movements other than in the eyes, and retains conscious awareness. Communication may be established
through eye or eyelid movements.
Minimally conscious state: A condition of severely altered consciousness in which a patient demonstrates minimal but
definite behavioral evidence of self or environmental awareness on a sustained basis, including at least one of the following:
following simple commands, gestural or verbal yes/no responses, intelligible speech, or purposeful behavior. Near the upper
boundary of functioning, patients in MCS may say words or phrases and gesture, and may show evidence of memory and
attention. They are considered to have “emerged” from MCS only when they can reliably and consistently communicate.
Vegetative state: A diagnosis based on the PRESENCE OF: recovery of reticular system sufficient to sustain basic functions
such as breathing, spontaneous eye-opening with evidence of sleep-wake cycles on EEG, bowel and bladder incontinence,
cranial-nerve and spinal reflexes; and the ABSENCE OF: awareness of self or the environment, ability to interact with others,
sustained, reproducible, purposeful, or voluntary behavioral responses to multi-sensory stimuli; and evidence of language
comprehension or expression.
Persistent vegetative state: A prognosis of the likelihood of a patient in a VS recovering consciousness based on the cause of
brain injury (traumatic or nontraumatic) and the length of time the person has been in the VS. With traumatic brain injury, VS is
considered irreversible after 12 months, and with nontraumatic brain injury, after 3 months. This prognosis is based on
statistical probability of recovery. Based on recent studies, researchers have questioned whether rare cases of late recovery
from PVS (i.e., after many years) really involved patients in a minimally conscious state (MCS) who were misdiagnosed. The
rare individuals who have emerged from PVS almost always remained in a MCS.
Permanent vegetative state: An alternative to the term “persistent vegetative state” that denotes the prognosis of irreversible
VS.
Sources:
Giacino, J. & Whyte, J. (2005). The vegetative and minimally conscious states: current knowledge and remaining questions. J
Head Trauma Rehabil., 20(1):30-50.
Laureys, S., Owen, A.M. & Schiff, N.D. (2004). Brain function in coma, vegetative state, and related disorders. Lancet, 3:537546.
The Multi-Society Task Force PVS (1994). Medical aspects of the persistent vegetative state. New England Journal of
Medicine, 330:1499-1509, 1572-1579.
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EDUCATION AND CONSULTATION

E

ducation, consultation, and
policy review and
development—these are the
most widely recognized roles of
healthcare ethics committees. The first
two dominate the work of most ethics
committees. Yet, a review of the
literature on healthcare ethics
committees yields more articles about
consultation than education. Is this
because ethics committees spend most
of their time doing consults? Research
doesn’t support this assumption. A
1997 survey of Maryland healthcare
ethics committees revealed that an
average of 2.87 consults were
conducted per 100 hospital beds that
year (Hoffmann, Tarzian & O’Neil,
2000). That’s not a lot of consults to
keep a committee busy. Has the number
of ethics consults per institution
increased since 1997? Perhaps.
But that raises yet another question:
Should the goal of ethics committees be
to increase their number of consults?
Some ethics committees have
established different goals, such as
fostering ethics knowledge and skills
among staff. Without relying too
heavily on the ethics committee or
consultants, staff could then more
adeptly resolve ethical conflicts in their
daily practice. While more complicated
ethical conflicts and dilemmas should
be referred to the ethics committee,
there are basic ethics issues that might
be defined as “ethics standards of
care;” that is, the basics about ethical
decision-making and conflict resolution
that all health care professionals should
know about. Some ethics committees
see their role as working toward the
goal of all professionals at their
institution being proficient in these
“basic ethics standards.” Others
expand that scope to include patients,
family members, or members of the
larger community in their educational
efforts.

. . . the goal of ethics consultation may not be just to
resolve individual conflicts or dilemmas, but to provide
an opportunity for learning and moral reflection in an
otherwise fast-paced health care facility, what Margaret
Urban Walker referred to as a “moral space.”

So, how do these committees implement
the task of educating staff or others? Here
are a number of ways:
•Ethics rounds – having a member of the
ethics committee round in the ICU or other
areas of the hospital to help identify and
raise awareness of ethical issues
•Ethics Grand rounds – hosting lectures
on ethics topics or case studies
•Ethics training courses or workshops –
either holding in-house workshops or
sponsoring staff to attend external
courses or workshops
•Newsletters – writing and distributing
institutional newsletters highlighting the
work of the ethics committee
•Incorporating ethical language &
concepts into patient meetings
•Sending e-mail to all staff to present or
discuss an ethics case
•Being more inclusive about whom to
include in ethics consults, to expand
educational opportunities for all
The last bullet presents a provocative
idea: that the goal of ethics consultation
may not be just to resolve individual
conflicts or dilemmas, but to provide an
opportunity for learning and moral

reflection in an otherwise fast-paced
health care facility, what Margaret
Urban Walker referred to as a “moral
space.” Some health care professionals
are reluctant to request ethics consults.
They may feel that ethics consultations
take too much time, or that they overly
complicate a patient’s care by adding
yet more people to those already
involved. They may feel that they are
just as able as the ethics consultant(s)
to resolve patient care issues that have
ethical dimensions. But if ethics
consultation is framed as an opportunity
to expand the opportunity to learn from
difficult cases, and to “protect moral
space” in an institution, perhaps
education and consultation can co-exist
harmoniously as worthy goals of any
ethics committee. To that end, it’s
unclear whether facility-wide ethics
education would lead to fewer consults
as a result of increased independence in
ethical reasoning abilities among staff,
or more consults, as a result of
increased awareness of ethical issues
and the need to dialogue about them.
REFERENCES
Hoffmann, D., Tarzian, A., & O’Neil, J.A.
(2000). Are ethics committee members
competent to consult? The Journal of
Law, Medicine & Ethics, 28(1): 30-40.
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PHILOSOPHER’S CORNER
PERSONHOOD

T

he concept of personhood was
formed in response to basic
philosophical questions like,
“When does human life begin?” and
“Who has moral standing in society?”
Technology has pushed the limits of the
debate by its ability to both create and
extend life, raising the question of
whether the embryo, fetus, and patient in
a persistent vegetative state should be
afforded the same moral worth, rights,
and protections as other human beings.
Most scholars generally agree that a
living, organic being of human origin is a
human being. Meaning, it is not a giraffe
being, it is not a drosophila being, it is a
human being. Moreover, this being
comes into existence once gametes fuse.
The debate about abortion, euthanasia
and the like has turned to whether
existing as a human being means existing
simultaneously as a person. There are
two approaches to this question about
what it means to be a person, what we will
call the “cognitive criteria” standard and
the “human-beings-as-persons” standard.
The latter holds that human beings,
regardless of their cognitive capacity or
stage of development, are persons with
inalienable and extrinsic rights that
deserve protection (Spitzer, 2000). The
cognitive criteria standard holds that
being human is necessary but not
sufficient for being a person, and that
persons have a unique moral status that
confers rights to them that are not owed
to non-persons.1 According to the second
view, criteria for personhood include
awareness of oneself over time (i.e., of a
lived past and anticipated future), the
cognitive capacity to reason and to act
freely, and the ability to communicate
through verbal or nonverbal language
(Beauchamp, 1999).2
There are problems with maintaining
either view. Starting with the cognitive
criteria standard, this view explains why
the autonomy of the pregnant woman
who has decided to end a pregnancy
trumps the interest of the fetus. The
woman, as a person, has rights, including
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the right to make decisions about
whether to gestate a fetus and deliver a
baby. The fetus, as a non-person, has no
such right. But what about the newborn
who is no longer gestating in the womb?
Such a newborn is not a person
according to the cognitive criteria
version of personhood—newborns have
no self-awareness and cannot reason.
The same criteria that justify abortion
should apply for infanticide, and yet
infanticide remains almost universally
condemned. Thus, the cognitive criteria
version of personhood can’t answer why
abortion can be morally justified but not
infanticide.
Espousing the human-being-as-person
standard carries with it its own set of
problems. If every human life, from the
moment of conception, is a human
person, then embryos are persons. As
such, they deserve the same rights and
protections as other incarnated persons.
This is a basic argument against
abortion, equating the destruction of
human embryos or fetuses as morally
equivalent to killing a living person. Yet,
among those who share this view, one
rarely sees the same moral outrage over a
homeless person who freezes to death on
the street as that encountered when a
leftover embryo is destroyed. That is,
some who hold this view do not display
behaviors that parallel their alleged
reverence for all persons—born and preborn. For example, they oppose abortion,
but do not demand social policy reform
to eliminate cultural and social influences
that perpetuate the need for abortion.
This apparent hypocrisy leaves them
vulnerable to criticism.
The human-beings-as-persons
standard of personhood advocates for
humans (born and pre-born) who cannot
speak for themselves, but offers little
guidance about when it is ethically
acceptable to forego life-prolonging
interventions for humans who are unable
to voice their own preferences. The
cognitive criteria standard of personhood
provides a framework for deciding under

what set of circumstances life-sustaining
treatments could be withheld or
withdrawn (e.g., for those in a persistent
vegetative state or minimally conscious
state, when personhood is lost), but
risks devaluing lives of humans who are
severely cognitively impaired. Perceived
obligations of the principle of respect for
persons may influence how one sides on
this issue. Some may think that
protecting vulnerable individuals who
can’t make decisions for themselves
requires a uniform pro-life stance,
whereas others may be apt to apply a
mindful benefits-burdens calculation in
deciding matters of life and death for
such individuals. Whether these
individuals are persons, and how that
should factor in the decision-making, is
the point in question.
Brigit M. Ciccarello, M.A.
Bioethicist
Ellicott City, MD
Anita J. Tarzian, PhD, RN
Ethics & Research Consultant
Baltimore, MD
REFERENCES
Beauchamp, T. (1999). The failure of
theories of personhood. Kennedy
Institute of Ethics Journal, 9(4), 309-324.
Spitzer, Robert J, S.J., Ph.D. Healing The
Culture. Ingatius Press, San Francisco;
2000.
Endnotes
1

Some would say humanness is not required,
but there is currently inconclusive evidence
that any species other than humans possess
self-awareness and the capacity to reason.

2

Beauchamp also introduced the concept of
“moral personhood,” attributed to those who
are capable of making moral judgments about
right and wrong actions, and who have
motives that can be judged morally (p. 315).

CASE PRESENTATION

O

ne of the regular features of
the Newsletter is the presentation
of a case considered by an ethics
committee and an analysis of the ethical
issues involved. Readers are both
encouraged to comment on the case or
analysis and to submit other cases that
their ethics committee has dealt with. In
all cases, identifying information about
patients and others in the case should
only be provided with the permission of
the patient. Unless otherwise indicated,
our policy is not to identify the submitter
or institution. Cases and comments should
be sent to MHECN@law.umaryland.edu,
or MHECN, the Law & Health Care
Program, University of Maryland School of
Law, 500 W. Baltimore St., Baltimore, MD
21201.

CASE STUDY FROM A
MARYLAND HOSPICE

M

r. Bracken is a 72 year old man
who was diagnosed two years
ago with lung cancer that has
recently spread to the liver and bone.
While in the hospital to treat his
shortness of breath and control his pain,
he makes it known that he does not want
further attempts at curative therapy.
Rather, he would like to be kept as
comfortable as possible and return home
to his apartment, where he has lived
alone for the past eight years. Mr.
Bracken is described by staff as
eccentric, stubborn, and “fiercely
independent.” He appears distrustful of
strangers, at times to the point of
seeming paranoid, but his physician
evaluates him as being cognitively intact
and capable of making his own end-oflife decisions. It’s explained to him that
to go home to his apartment, he will
need assistance with his daily needs and
medical (palliative) care, and that home
hospice can provide this. After much
encouragement (he thinks he can
manage on his own), he agrees to the
hospice referral. When the hospice
liaison interviews him in the hospital,
she explains that hospice typically
requires that a caregiver be present in

the home. Mr. Bracken explains that he
will be fine in his apartment—his
neighbor is available if he needs help, he
has everything he needs by his bedside,
he can make it to the bathroom and front
door, and Meals-On-Wheels brings a
daily meal to him. He insists he be
allowed to continue living on his own. He
has limited other support systems, being
estranged from his family. He maintains
minimal contact with a daughter who
lives in another city, about 120 miles
away. He is admitted to the home hospice
program, and a nurse, Ms. Tracey, is
assigned. Despite coming up with a
creative plan of care to allow Mr. Bracken
to live on his own, after a couple of
weeks after Mr. Bracken is admitted to
home hospice, Ms. Tracey and the
hospice home health aide assigned to
care for him have several causes for
concern about Mr. Bracken’s safety. He
continues to smoke cigarettes, despite
being on oxygen (he insists he turns the
oxygen off and smokes away from the
oxygen tank). He sometimes forgets to
take all the medications in the pre-dosed
medicine box prepared by the nurse. And
apparently, due to increasing weakness,
he uses a rolling office chair to get back
and forth from his bed to the front door
and bathroom. Roaches and rodents are
visible. Nevertheless, he insists that he
be allowed to stay where he is
comfortable and refuses to consider
transfer to a group home or inpatient
hospice facility. The nurse consults the
hospice ethics committee about how far
to go in respecting Mr. Bracken’s
autonomy.

RESPONSE FROM A
HOSPICE MEDICAL
DIRECTOR
“It’s all about me” –
Dying, dignity, and the
limits of autonomy

A

couple of years ago, a patient
walked into my office with the
words, “I can’t breathe

anymore.” Two hours later, we had a
tentative diagnosis of lung cancer; by
that evening, we had pathologic
confirmation.
The patient – elderly, independent,
and as ‘ornery’ as our Mr. Bracken – was
adamant in his refusal of any curative
treatment. “Make me breathe better, and
I’ll be happy.” His symptoms were
relatively easy to treat – low-dose
steroids, sublingual morphine as needed,
and an inhaler.
What was impossible to treat was his
rapid functional decline. He left his home
of almost 50 years, moved in with a
cousin, and continued to deteriorate.
Our hospice service saw him from the
outset of his diagnosis, and his primary
nurse and social worker expressed similar
concerns to those voiced by Mr.
Bracken’s team – the cousin (technically
the ‘caregiver’) was rarely home, and
when he was home, he was often drunk.
The patient took his medicines
haphazardly, eventually stopped bathing,
and after a few weeks, never left the
confines of his bedroom. With a
tremendous amount of coaxing (which
bordered on coercion), he accepted a
move to a group home “where he would
be safer.” Two days later, the group
home director called 911 when she found
the patient unconscious, with an empty
bottle of morphine by the bed.
Before we could intervene, the patient
was intubated in the emergency
department (the anxious triage nurse
pointed out that she was told that this
was an attempted suicide), and was
admitted to intensive care.
An estranged daughter, the hospice
nurse, the hospice social worker, the ICU
attending, and I gathered to discuss
options. He was, at this point, wellventilated, and stable, but incapable of
maintaining a level of consciousness that
would protect his airway. The intensivist
suggested he be given ‘some narcan, to
wake him up and ask him what he wants
to do.’ The hospice nurse almost
screamed her objection. The social
worker suggested he be maintained on
the ventilator until his level of
consciousness improved, and that he
Cont. on page 8
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CASE PRESENTATION
then be transferred to a nursing home,
‘because he’s going to need more
supervision.’ The daughter was baffled
by the discussion – “If you’d ever really
known my dad, you should have seen
this coming – I’d just let him go.” We
eventually decided to extubate him,
transfer him to our inpatient palliative
care unit, and ‘take our chances.’ He
died about 4 hours after extubation,
quietly, without any further medical
interventions.
My patient’s case – as messy as it is –
is one possible ending to the choices
facing Mr. Bracken and his team. But I’d
like to point out several salient features:
•‘Autonomy’ – at least as it’s commonly
used in the ethics literature – is a
remarkably brittle foundation on which to
construct a theory of action. It cracks
(often, with little effort), can be slippery,
and one person’s autonomy can often
seem like another’s prison (as my
intensivist colleague later commented to
me, ‘I’m not in the habit of aiding
suicides.’)
•The law – again, as currently derived –
is also less than satisfying. The duly
designated proxy in this case – the
estranged daughter – might be legally
empowered to make a decision (which is
precisely what hospital counsel told us
when we consulted them), but her
attitude was more one of resignation (and
some irritation at getting dragged into
‘another one of Dad’s messes’). She was
clearly not the thoughtful ‘substitute
judger’ that we read about in the ethics
literature.
•The hospice nurse was – appropriately,
I think – horrified at the idea of waking
up a terminally ill patient to his pain,
dyspnea, and fear ‘just so that we can all
feel better about ourselves.’
•The hospice social worker pointed out
that one of the principles of a ‘good

8
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hospice death’ was that it be “safe, and
dying of an overdose in a group home is
hardly ‘safe’.”
The decision we reached was,
essentially, one of exclusion – we each
said what we wouldn’t be willing to
accept (or, better, what we each thought,
from our professional and personal
perspectives, was ethically
unacceptable). But none of us had a
clean, satisfying course of action. The
patient solved potential future problems
by dying (rather than regaining
consciousness, and thereby forcing us,
once again, to decide the question of
disposition).
Finally, though, what Mr. Bracken’s
case misses – as did the case above – is
the complexity, context, texture, and
sheer chaos of human behavior. My
sense is that Mr. Bracken would be
willing to accept all of the potential
possibilities for an ‘unsafe’ and untidy
death that continuing to live alone might
entail. And I might even be willing to
accept his decision – as long as he could
answer for me the same question that the
group home director asked of me after I
told her about the resident’s death: “I
guess that’s nice for him, but who’s
going to clean up the mess?
Everybody’s upset here. I don’t think
my residents are going to let me take in
another hospice patient if they’re just
going to kill themselves.”
The only person I might consider
completely autonomous, in the end, is a
hermit, with no family, no relation, and no
community memory of his existence. I
don’t know if such a person has ever
actually existed in history. For the rest of
us – including the Mr. Brackens’ of this
world – every decision we make, even if
it’s ultimately ‘about me,’ has its own life
and afterlife, long after we’re gone.
Carlos Gomez, MD
Medical Director
Capital Hospice, Fairfield, VA

RESPONSE FROM
A HOSPICE
ADMINISTRATOR

T

his case is as common as it is
problematic. It is the rare hospice
Interdisciplinary Team (IDT)
Meeting without discussion of a patient
sharing some elements in Mr. Bracken’s
story. Easy answers are even rarer, but a
first approach to resolving them is to
distinguish between the effect of
patients’ choices upon themselves and
the effect of their choices upon others.
Mr. Bracken’s smoking puts his
neighbors at risk.
As an apartment dweller, Mr. Bracken
has neighbors adjacent to his walls.
While we might defend his right to
choose living in a potentially unsafe but
comfortingly familiar environment over
moving to a less personally appealing
but safer place, we are not justified in
allowing him to jeopardize his neighbors’
safety.
If Mr. Bracken forgets to take his
medications even when they are in a predosed medicine box by his bed, chances
are high that he will forget to turn off his
oxygen before smoking. In his
increasingly weakened state, it’s also
reasonable to assume that he will at some
time smoke in bed. The tanks would be
nearby. Furthermore, his medications
probably will make him more somnolent.
This increases risk of fire from cigarette
ashes on bedclothes. He could also
easily fall from his rolling desk chair with
a lighted cigarette in his fingers. Even if
Ms. Tracey could elicit a promise to stop
smoking from Mr. Bracken, it would be
naïve to think he would keep it.
State and federal regulations, as well
as professional standards, prohibit the
staff from disclosing information about
Mr. Bracken’s condition to them without
his explicit permission. Furthermore,
even if the staff did ignore those rules
and inform the landlord or other tenants
it would be unreasonable to expect
others to vacate their homes or assume
risk of fire.

Suppose Mr. Bracken lived alone in a
trailer in the middle of a large soybean
field? Even then the staff should
consider the risk taken by fire
responders. A twenty five year old could
die trying to save Mr. Bracken.
It is not clear from the case as
presented if either his daughter or
neighbor has been designated Mr.
Bracken’s “primary caregiver” or if he
has given permission to the hospice to
share with them protected health
information. If not, the staff should
encourage Mr. Bracken to give such
permission and speak with at least one of
them about the implications of his
choices. At the very least they could cut
off his supply of cigarettes. Mr. Bracken
might have a right to refuse relocation
but no one is obligated to provide him
with cigarettes.
Given his “ornery” personality, his
formal designation of a health care agent
is as unlikely as it is desirable; however
the staff should encourage Mr. Bracken
to make such a designation if the other
person is willing to accept it. If Mr.
Bracken refuses to allow staff to
communicate with either his daughter or
neighbor and if the cigarette supply is
not cut off, the hospice should report the
situation to Adult Protective Services or
the appropriate local authority.
The hospice should also report Mr.
Bracken’s home conditions and the
hospice’s risk assessment to the
physician ordering care for Mr. Bracken.
Even if there is little evidence of decline
in mental capacity, the hospice care plan
should reflect plans to repeat the earlier
evaluation at some time. The Medical
Director or hospice physician might also
visit Mr. Bracken periodically and
communicate findings to the attending
physician.
Often Meals on Wheels volunteers
observe risks and report them to the
health care agency connected to that
program. Fear about breaking HIPAA
rules has silenced some of the
communication that used to flow more
easily among health care organizations

but the hospice might explore the legal
ramifications of communicating with the
local agency.
Mr. Bracken’s condition will continue
to worsen. He will be less able to eat
unassisted, to administer his own
medications, toilet, answer the door, and
answer the phone. If Mr. Bracken is still
at home when he becomes bed bound, at
some point the visiting staff and
volunteers might be unable to leave him.
Therefore the care plan should include a
provision to increase volunteer services,
ideally around the clock. Realistically,
however, it is the rare volunteer who can
take many hours in a dirty, roach infested
apartment. The patient’s condition might
also warrant a few days of continuous
care if nursing is needed for eight or more
hours a day. Given the danger to others
of his smoking, hospice staff should
remove matches from Mr. Bracken’s
reach.
As staff members deepen their
relationship with Mr. Bracken, they
should continually encourage him to
move to the hospice residence or to a
nursing facility. He is most likely eligible
for Medicaid, which would pay for his
room and board at a nursing facility.
Hospice personnel can continue to visit
and care for him in his new home.
When patients are hospitalized or in a
nursing facility the range of their choices
is so severely limited and the power of
staff and physicians to influence patients
is so great that we must put great
emphasis on defending patient
autonomy. When patients are at home
and especially when they are alone at
home, their choices are much broader
and the consequences of their choices
go well beyond the effect on others of a
patient in an institution.
Marion Keenan, MA, MBA
President
Coastal Hospice
Salisbury, MD

INTERACTIVE
CONSENT
SOFTWARE

F

lorida Hospital Orlando became
the first hospital in the country to
use new interactive informed
consent software for surgical patients.
The software program uses audio,
streaming video, animation, and touch
screens to walk patients through planned
surgical treatments (to date, cardiac
patients undergoing angioplasty,
catheterization, and stenting). The
program explains the nature, indications,
complications, equipment, risks, and
alternatives of a planned surgical
procedure, and then tests the patient’s
level of understanding.
Scott Pollak, MD, the Florida Hospital
cardiologist who helped develop the
software, explained, “These days, many
patients are taking a more proactive
approach to their own healthcare. They
often search the internet and other
medical sources for information about
their condition and treatment. The
interactive informed consent tool will
ensure patients get thorough and accurate
information right in the hospital setting.”
The interactive consent software is
played on a special touch screen that
allows patients to stop, rewind, and
review the presentation. It is mounted
on a cart that rolls up to the patient’s
bedside. The patient takes a test at the
end of each section. The doctor then
receives a printout indicating the
patient’s score and any questions he or
she might have, which helps the
physician target the informed consent
discussion to the patient’s needs. If the
software proves to be a success, it will
be developed for other procedures as
well. Dr. Kerry Schwartz, a cardiologist
who works with Pollack, predicts such
success, stating, “Overall, a more
informed patient, who is actively
involved in his or her health care, be it
preventive or therapeutic, will do better
in the long run. This interactive process
will greatly enhance this involvement.”
For more information about the
software, go to http://
www.floridahospitalmedicalnews.com/
news-Cardiology-id143.html.
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LEGISLATIVE UPDATE
Federal Legislation
Pain Care Policy Act of 2005
(House Bill 1020)
The National Pain Care Policy Act of
2005 is currently before the House Health
Subcommittee. This bill would prompt a
White House Conference on Pain Care
and a national public awareness
campaign. It would also require military
health care facilities and veterans health
care facilities to provide more extensive
pain care. Managed health care plans
offering Medicare Advantage plans
would be required to include appropriate
pain treatment. For more information,
please visit www.painfoundation.org.

Maryland Legislation
Senate Bills 718 and 321 Hospitals-HIV
Testing–Consent and Public Safety
Workers
This new legislation adds public safety
workers to the list of individuals whose
exposure to the bodily fluids of a hospital

patient (or patient prior to hospital
admission) triggers an HIV test of that
patient, even without his or her consent.
Previously, the testing was limited to
exposure of health care providers and first
responders. Public safety workers are
defined in the legislation as career or
volunteer members of a fire, rescue, or
emergency medical services department,
company, squad, or auxiliary; any law
enforcement officer; or the State Fire
Marshal or a sworn member of the Fire
Marshal’s office. These bills were both
signed by Governor Ehrlich on May 10,
2005.

Senate Bill 247–Health Care Decision
Making Forms–Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act–
Personal Representatives
Clarifying the effect of the federal
Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) on advance
directives, this bill amends the Health Care
Decisions Act and states that a health
care agent is a personal representative and
may receive protected health information
to aid in making informed decisions
regarding an individual’s health care. This
bill was signed into law by Governor
Ehrlich on April 26, 2005.

House Bill 565 Hospitals–Bone Marrow
Donation
Hospitals that offer bone marrow
transplant services are now required to
allow individuals to donate bone marrow if
the physician agrees that the donation will
benefit the donee without undue risk to
the donor. This bill was signed into law by
Governor Ehrlich on May 10, 2005.

Failed Maryland Legislation
Legislation to create a Maryland Stem cell
research Fund offering grants and loans to
public and private entities of the state to
support embryonic stem cell research failed
to pass during the session. In addition,
legislation that would have required
increased reporting requirements from
clinical trial sponsors, as well as change the
requirements for institutional review boards,
failed to pass.

MEDICAL DECISIONS ACT
NOT TIME

O

n May 20th,Gov. Robert Ehrlich
vetoed Senate Bill 796, the
Medical Decisions Act of 2005
after its passage by the Maryland General
Assembly. The bill would have allowed
domestic partners residing in Maryland to
register in a state-maintained Life
Partnership Registry. Life partners would
then be ensured visitation rights in
medical emergencies and enjoy the same
rights afforded married couples on issues
of medical decisions. Gov. Ehrlich
acknowledged a need to protect
unmarried couples but ultimately
concluded that their rights should be
addressed by creating “a central directory
of advance directives and related legal
documents” instead of defining a new
category of legal relationship that “could
lead to the erosion of the sanctity of
10
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traditional marriage as already codified in
Maryland law.” Equality Maryland, the
state’s largest gay and lesbian rights
organization, responded stating that the
majority of rights contained within the
now defeated bill “cannot be
accomplished through an advance
directive, power of attorney or last will
and testament.” The organization accuses
Gov. Ehrlich of bowing to political
pressure despite the fact that the bill
expansively defined life partnership and
explicitly avoided the issue of same-sex
marriage. Gov. Ehrlich pledged to work
with the General Assembly on future
legislation to address these health care
concerns.
Under current law, if a decisionallyincapable person is diagnosed as being
terminally ill, in an end-stage condition, or

a persistent vegetative state, an unmarried
partner who has not been appointed as
the patient’s health care agent has the
least priority in the hierarchy of surrogate
decision-makers. She or he can sign an
affidavit attesting to having an intimate
relationship with the patient and knowing
his or her end-of-life wishes, but the
patient’s parent, adult child, or sibling will
be consulted first. This becomes
especially problematic when a patient who
has AIDS and is gay has kept these facts
from his family, preferring that they not be
told. Yet, in order to make medical
decisions for the patient, the surrogate
must be told the reality of his medical
situation. Ethically, the partner may be the
one most appropriate to make decisions
on behalf of such a patient, but legally, the
family takes precedence.

CALENDAR OF EVENTS
SEPTEMBER
22-24

The ‘E’ Word: The Role of Emotion in Health Care. The 5th Annual Quandaries in Health Care conference, the
Given Institute of the University of Colorado, Aspen, CO. For more information, contact Mary Lou Wallace at
303-315-5096

23

The New Medical Malpractice Legislation: Issues, Implementation & Impact, conference sponsored by
University of Maryland School of Law Center for Dispute Resolution (CDRUM) and Law & Health Care Program.
For more information, visit www.law.umaryland.edu/conferences.asp, or contact Toby Treem at 410-706-6228

23

The Changing Healthcare Landscape: Ethical Choices, Scientific Promises, and the Quality of Life, conference
sponsored by New Jersey Health Decisions, New Jersey Law Center, New Brunswick, NJ. For more information,
contact njhd@verizon.net, or call 973-857-5552

OCTOBER
14

Ethics Across the Lifespan in Life-Limiting Illness, Sponsored by Capital Hospice Institute for Education and
Leadership, Fairfax County Government Center, Fairfax, VA. For more information, visit www.capitalhospice.org/
healthcare/educational

17- 20 International Health Care Ethics Colloquium, Georgetown University, Washington, DC. Topics include:
Methods in Bioethics, Moral Pedagogy, Clinical Ethics, Organizational Ethics, and Research Ethics.
October 18th is a one day Symposium on Culture and Ethics. For more information, visit
http://clinicalbioethics.georgetown.edu or call 202-687-1122
20

David Flood, PhD, “Transplant Donor-Recipient Relationship: Being informed from urban legends, fiction, film
and medical ethics.” Medical Humanities Hour lecture, Shock Trauma Auditorium, University of Maryland
Medical Center, 22 S. Greene Street, Baltimore. 4-5 PM. For more information, contact
hsilverm@medicine.umaryland.edu

20-23

Suffering and Justice, Annual Meeting of the American Society for Bioethics & Humanities. Omni Shoreham
Hotel, Washington, D.C. Includes a Clinical Ethics Consultation pre-conference workshop on October 20. For
more information, visit http://www.asbh.org

21

Mourning Through the Lens of Various Faith Traditions, Sponsored by Capital Hospice Institute for Education
and Leadership, Fairfax County Government Center, Fairfax, VA. For more information, visit
www.capitalhospice.org/healthcare/educational

28

Beyond the New Medical Malpractice Legislation, conference sponsored by University of Maryland School of
Law Center for Dispute Resolution (CDRUM) and Law & Health Care Program. For more information, visit
www.law.umaryland.edu/conferences.asp, or contact Toby Treem at 410-706-6228

NOVEMBER
7-9

Improving Care for Those Experiencing Life-Limiting Illness. Seventh Annual Josefina Magno Conference
Series, sponsored by Capital Hospice. Falls Church, VA. For more information, visit http://
www.capitalhospice.org/healthcare/educational/Seminars.asp

10

Eric Cassell, MD, “The nature of suffering applied to the whole patient.” The Dr. & Mrs. Howard B. Mays
Lectureship in the History of Medicine and Ethics (Medical Humanities Hour lecture), Shock Trauma Auditorium,
University of Maryland Medical Center, 22 S. Greene St., Baltimore. 4-5 PM. For more information, contact
hsilverm@medicine.umaryland.edu

DECEMBER
1

Joseph A. Carrese, MD, MPH, “Examining ethical issues at the interface of different cultural systems.” Medical
Humanities Hour lecture, Shock Trauma Auditorium, University of Maryland Medical Center, 22 S. Greene St.,
Baltimore. 4-5PM. For more information, contact hsilverm@medicine.umaryland.edu
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